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MONTANA LAW REVIEW
and opportunity at hand, and backed by the active interest of
the bar, the efforts at recodification promise for Montana a
bright chance to achieve a new modern code in the Revised
Codes of 1947.
James A. Nelson.
MODERN TREND OF THE LAW OF CONTRIBUTION
AMONG JOINT TORTFEASORS
The law of contribution is founded upon equitable prin-
ciples and based upon the desire for a proportionate distribu-
tion of a common burden among those obligated. Thus it
seems strange to hear the general rule stated today, in most
American jurisdictions, that there can be no contribution
among joint tortfeasors. The policy of the Anglo-American
common law has been to deny assistance to tortfeasors simply
on the theory that they are wrongdoers and therefore not en-
titled to a proportionate distribution of the common burden.
To gain a clearer concept of the reasons for such a rule, its
application today, and the trend away from the same, it is
necessary to take a brief glance at the historical background
of the law on this subject.
It is quite generally accepted that the rule had its origin
in 1799 in the famous case of Merryweather v. Nixon.' In this
case a judgment was recovered jointly against the plaintiff and
defendant in an action for injury to a reversionary interest in
a mill and trover for certain machinery. Plaintiff was levied
on for the whole judgment, and he then sued the defendant for
contribution. Plaintiff was denied such a right on the grounds
that his action rested upon what was, in the eyes of the law, his
own deliberate wrong. In spite of the meager report of the
case, it seems clear that the action proceeded on the theory of a
malicious and wanton tort. Therefore, it appears that the rule
set down was merely that no contribution should be allowed
between wilful and intentional wrongdoers, but later authori-
ties seized upon the decision as stating the general rule that no
contribution should be allowed among joint tortfeasors as a
class.
Subsequent English cases, however, seemed to recognize
the limitation of the doctrine of Merryweather v. Nixon and
applied the rule against contribution only where the plaintiff
was a wilful and conscious wrongdoer.' In 1894 a case arose in
'8 Term Rep. 186.
'Adamson v. Jarvis 1827, 4 Bing. 66; Betts v. Gibbons 1834, 2 Ad. & El.
57; Pearson v. Skelton 1836, 1 M. & W. 504.
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Scotland in which a judgment was recovered against two work-
men for negligently causing the death of a third. Contribution
was allowed in favor of the workman from whom the judgment
was recovered on the grounds that the rule against contribution
did not apply to cases involving mere negligence.8 Therefore,
today, it may be reliably stated that the better English common
law view appears to be that contribution is not denied in cases
of mere negligence, accident, mistake, or other unintentional
breaches of the law of torts.'
In the United States early cases seemed to hold that the
denial of the right to contribution among tortfeasors was not
the general rule to be applied, but that such was an exception
to be applicable only where the party claiming the right was
guilty of wilful misconduct.' In Theweatt's Adm'r. v. Jones,'
decided in 1825, the Court refused to deny contribution where
the party claiming the right was guilty of a tort committed
due to negligence or mistake. In this case the tortfeasors
were co-inspectors of tobacco who by negligence delivered to-
bacco to a wrong party. The reasoning of the Court was ex-
pressed as follows:
"The reason why the law refuses its aid to enforce
contribution amongst wrongdoers is that they may be in-
timidated from committing the wrong, by the danger of
each being made responsible for all the consequences; a
reason which does not apply to torts or injuries arising
from mistakes or accidents, or involuntary omissions in
the discharge of official duties."
However, the reason for the rule prohibiting contribution
in cases of wilful torts, but allowing it where the tort com-
mitted was due merely to the negligence or inadvertant act of
the tortfeasor was lost sight of when joinder in one action of
those who had caused the same damage was permitted. Ir-
reconcilable conflict arose in the various jurisdictions as to
whether the rule denying contribution was one of general ap-
plication. Apparently, the majority of American courts, at
'Palmer v. Wick & Pulteneytown Steam Shipping Co. 1894, A. C. 318.
'Palmer Case, Supra note 3; Burrows v. Rhodes 1899, 1 QB 816; Hillen
v. I. C. 1., 1934, 1 KB 455.
'Peck v. Ellis, 1816, 2 Johns. Ch, N. Y. 131; Miller v. Fenton, 1844, 393,11 Paige N. Y. 18; Hunt v. Lane, 1857, 9 Ind. 248; Rhea v. White, 1859,3 Head, Tenn. 121; Atkins v. Johnson, 1870, 43 Vt. 78, 5 Am. Rep. 260.01 Rand. 328, 22 Va. 328, 10 Am. Dec. 528; See also Horback's Adm'rs.
v. Elder 1851, 18 Pa. 33; Acheson v. Miller 1853, 2 Ohio St. 203, 59 Am.Dec. 663; Bailey v. Bussing 1859, 28 Conn. 455: Armstrong County v.Clarion County, 66 Pa. 218, 5 Am. Dec. 368; Nickerson v. Wheeler,
1875, 118 Mass. 295.
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the present writing refuse to permit contribution even where
independent, though concurrent, negligence, has contributed
to a single loss.'
The reasoning of such courts seems influenced to a great
extent by a faulty historical interpretation of the Merryweath-
er Case. The rule is generally and flatly stated that there can
be no contribution among joint wrongdoers, or tortfeasors,
and the logic of such rule is said to be that the law will not
lend equitable aid in the form of requiring one joint wrong-
doer to contribute his share to another tortfeasor who has sat-
isfied the judgment, when the latter was guilty of some wrong.
These decisions fail to realize that all tortfeasors are not guilty
of intentional injury to others, and that most several and
joint liability results from inadvertently caused damage. They
adopt the view that tort liability, in whatever form, is based
on fault, and is therefore "punitive," and the rule denying
contribution extends to all tortfeasors. Perhaps this "ex-
tension" of the rule can be attributed to the unfortunate
meaning attached to the term "tortfeasor." The word tort,
from its derivation and usage, carries with it the suggestion of
wrongdoing. At the time of the Merryweather case, the mean-
ing of the term was actually so limited and narrow and had
not come to be applied to actions involving negligent and un-
intentional injuries."
The extent to which this rule became implanted in the
minds of many courts may be fairly well indicated by the view
taken by the Supreme Court in 1905 in the Union Stock Yards
Case.' Although this case involved an action for indemnity, Mr.
Justice Day stated, in an extrinsic discussion of the principles
of contribution, "that one of several wrongdoers cannot recover
against another wrongdoer, although he may have been com-
pelled to pay all of the damages for the wrong done." Such a
statement is striking due to the fact that the alleged "wrong"
in such case was the failure to inspect defective brakes, an ac-
tion founded upon negligence. A further, and perhaps more
notable illustration of such a view, is shown by the Restatement
of Restitution," which states:
7Union Stock Yards Co. v. Chicago B. & 0. R. Co., 196 U. S. 217, 49
L. Ed. 453; Ill. Cent. R. Co. v. La. Bridge Co., 1916, 188 S. W. 476,
171 Ky. 445; Village of Portland v. Citizens Tel. Co. 1919, 173 N. W.
382, 206 Mich. 632; Adams v. White Bus Line, 1921, 195 Pac. 389, 184
Cal. 710; Cain v. Quannah Light & Ice Co. 1928, 267 Pac. 641, 131
Okla. 25; Royal Indemnity Co. v. Becker, 1930, 173 N. E. 194, 122
Ohio St. 582, 75 A. L. R. 1481.
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"Where two persons acting independently or jointly
have negligently injured a third person or his property for
which injury both became liable in tort to a third person,
one of whom has made expenditures in discharge of their
liability is not entitled to contribution from the other."
The effect of this section, and the lack of any sound legal
basis for such a rule, becomes apparent by the fact that Com-
ment (a) of this same section states that such a rule "is ex-
plainable only upon historical grounds."
Thus the rule which, except where modified by statute,
appears to be accepted law in every American common law
jurisdiction other than Minnesota," Pennsylvania," Wiscon-
sin," Louisiana," and perhaps Oregon," is that there can be no
contribution between joint tortfeasors, irrespective of whether
the claimant is in moral or social fault, as where he is con-
scious of the wrongfulness of his conduct or is merely a tort-
feasor in the sense that for one reason or another he is liable
in an action in tort.
Three principal reasons of so-called public policy have been
constantly idvanced in justification of such a rule, founded
as it was on a decision based purely on lack of precedent and
rendered in a case in which the two parties had joined in
what apparently was a deliberate act of conscious wrongdoing.
The first contention is that by denying the claimant con-
tribution he will be deterred from committing misconducts.
It is clear, however, that denial of contribution could not be
an effective deterrent to wrongdoing by anyone who does not
realize that his conduct will subject him to liability for an in-
jury caused thereby. To say that the fear that he will be de-
nied contribution will make a man more attentive to what he
is doing "is to carry supposition to the point of absurdity."'*
The argument that the denial of contribution will act as a de-
terrent to tortious conduct has even less validity where the
person seeking it is guilty of no personal wrongdoing, but is
liable only because some policy of law or statute makes him
vicariously responsible. The assumption of the courts that
such a rule will cause prospective tortfeasors to refrain from
"Underwriters at Lloyds of Minneapolis v. Smith, 1926, 208 N. W. 13;
166 Minn. 388; Duluth, M. & N. R. Co. v. McCarthy, 1931, 236 N. W.
766, 183 Minn. 414.
"Goldman v. Mitchell-Fletcher Co., 1928, 141 A. 231, 22 Pa. 354.
"Ellis v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 1918, 167 N. W. 1048, 167 Wis. 392;
Mitchell v. Raymond 1923, 195 N. W. 855, 181 Wis. 591; (Matter is
now regulated by statute in Wis.).
"Quatray v. Wicker 1933, 151 So. 208, 178 La. 289.
"See Furbeck v. I. Gevurtz & Son, 1914, 143 P. 654, 72 Ore. 12.
"See 21 CORN. L. Q. 558.
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acts which might render them liable for the entire damages,
instead of a ratable proportion of them, is somewhat more per-
suasive when applied in cases of wilful torts. But here, also,
this is but a supposition which is not supported by any factual
showing that it has a deterrent effect. The fact that one tort-
feasor may be compelled to pay the entire damages, means that
his fellow-wrongdoers will go scot-free. Thus under this rule
of no contribution there is also the possibility of escaping all
liability, a fact that might cause many to be more willing rath-
er than less willing to engage in wrongful activity."
The second justification given in support of the rule is
that due to the fact that the claimant is a "wrongdoer," the
court should deny him the use of its forum. Such a reason
has some strength where the tortfeasor has been guilty of a
wilful and flagrant tort, but such reasoning breaks down
where the claimant has been guilty only of inadvertently
caused damage due to negligence. And there is absurdity in
even suggesting that this reason justifies the denial of con-
tribution to one whose liability is based solely on his vicarious
responsibility for the actual wrongdoer and who is himself in
no personal fault.
The third reason, namely that the law has no scales to de-
termine the relative guilt and, therefore, the relative respon-
sibility of persons whose tortious conduct concurs in causing
injury or damage to a third person, has been refuted by expe-
rience. For example, the FEDERAL EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT"'
makes the plaintiff's contributory negligence a matter to be tak-
en into account only as affecting the amount of his damages,
and there is no reason why the determination of the respective
amounts payable by joint tortfeasors should present any greater
difficulties.
These obvious defects, both theoretical and practical, have
caused contribution among joint tortfeasors to become an im-
portant item of law reform in this country. Before discussing
the attributes of the UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORT-
FEASORS ACT," it would be well to glance briefly at the various
statutory attempts of certain states to remedy the law on the
subject.'
In 1904 Kansas' abrogated the strict common law rule by
an opportune, if inaccurate, application of a statute providing
"See 81 PA. L. REv. 133.
145 U. S. C. A. 53.
199 UN. L. ANN. 159.
*
'See 45 HARV. L. REv. 369.
"Fort Scott v. Kansas City, 66 Kans. 610, 72 P. 238.
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that a judgment debtor who "pays more than (a due propor-
tion)-may compel contribution.' '
In 1861 Georgia enacted a bill permitting a suit for con-
tribution when a joint judgment had been entered against two
trespassers.' The scope of such a statute, however, has been con-
fined only to injuries to property caused by acts of trespass."
A Missouri act' passed in 1855 did not so confine the effect
of the statute, and extended the right to defendants in judg-
ments for "redress of a private wrong." Similar phraseology
was employed in a West Virginia statute" passed in 1872 and
in a Virginia statute" passed in 1872, and in other statutes
passed more recently."
A restriction of the right of contribution to specified
classes of joint tortfeasors is found in three states other than
Georgia. In Kentucky and Virginia. the statute is applicable
only where the tort is "a mere act of negligence and involves
no moral turpitude," a limitation suggestive of the rule set
down in the heretofore mentioned states which modified the
common law rule by judicial decision. Under the Michigan
statute,' contribution can be had only as between "joint li-
belers," although the reasoning prompting such a limited ex-
tension can not be easily detected.
Under the majority of these statutory grants of the right
of contribution, such a right is impaired by the usual require-
ment of a joint judgment as a condition precedent.' At com-
mon law a party injured by a joint tort could elect to sue one
or more of the wrongdoers;' and by a voluntary nonsuit he
"KAN. REV. STAT. ANN. Sec. 3437.
(Other states have similar enactments. CAL CODE CIVIL ProC. Sec. 709;
MONT. R. CODES Sec. 9451; OKLA. COMP. LAWS ANN. Sec. 730; ORE.
CODE ANN. 3-411; UTAH COMP. LAWS Sec. 6950; WASH. COMP. STAT.
Sec. 593; MINN. STAT. See. 9410; N. J. COMP. STAT. p. 2962; PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, Sec. 208; None of these states, however, have held such
statutes applicable to joint tortfeasors.)
"See GA. CODE ANN. Sec. 2012.
"Cox v. Strickland, 47 S. E. 912, 120 Ga. 104.
'Mo. REV. STAT. Sec. 3268.
"See W. VA. CODE (1931) c. 15, art. 7, 13.
"See VA. CODE ANN. Sec. 5779.
ON. M. STAT. ANN. Sec. 76-101; N. C. ConE ANN. Sec. 618; TEXAS REV.
CODE ANN. Sec. 2212; N. Y. LAWS, 1928 c. 714.
"KY. STAT. (1930) Sec. 484a; VA. CODE ANN. (1930) Sec. 5779; See note
18, 45 HARV. L. REv. 371. "An act 'merely negligent' which involves
moral turpitude defies imagination."
"MICH. COMP. LAWS (1920) Sec. 14497.
'GA; CODE ANN. Sec. 2012; Mo. STAT. ANN. Sec. 3268; N. M. STAT. ANN.
Sec. 618; TEXAS STAT. art. 2212; W. VA. CODE ANN. Sec. 5482; N. Y. C.
P. A. Sec. 211-a; N. C. ANN No. 618.
"See Atlantic & Pac. R. R. Co. v. Laird, 1896, 164 U. S. 393; Dow v.
Oroville 134 P. 197, 22 Cal. App. 215.
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could dismiss the action as to any of those he had named as
defendants.' Since under the contribution acts one defendant
has no rights against his co-defendant until a joint judgment
has been rendered, the courts have generally held that the
plaintiff's privileges remain unaffected by statute.' In one
instance, this weakness in the statutes was largely remedied
by a judicial decision,' and the statutes of Kentucky and Vir-
ginia' provide simply "that there shall be contribution among
tortfeasors," thus dispensing with the requirement of a joint
judgment and permitting separate suits to be brought against
co-tortfeasors whereever personal jurisdiction can be obtained.
But these latter statutes are in turn defective as they fail to
provide a method whereby a defendant may implead his fel-
low tortfeasors when they are within reach of process. The
North Carolina act t ' apparently meets all of these difficulties
by giving the defendant an election either to sue his joint tort-
feasors separately or to implead them in the initial cause.'
The terms "pro rata" and "proportionate part,"' used
to describe the amount of recovery, have ordinarily not been
expressly defined, but the courts applying the statutes have
assumed that an equal division among the tort defendants was
intended.' This is stated expressly in the Texas statute.' The
North Carolina act, however, contains a provision patterned
after the equitable rule of contribution among co-sureties.
Thus it is obvious that the legislatures or courts in many
of our states agree that the common law rule denying contri-
bution is no longer satisfactory. But they have not agreed
on a substitute for this rule." As noted in the aforementioned
statutes, such states all provide for contribution in one form
or another, but some of these jurisdictions have so limited the
right that its effect as a material or beneficial change of the
common law rule is slight.
Other jurisdictions permit contribution without stipulat-
ing that the common liability must rest on negligence or arise
out of torts of inadvertence, but even in such jurisdictions it
"See Amer. Express Co. v. Patterson, 1881, 73 Ind. 430.
'"Mashburn & Co. v. Dannenberg Co. 44 S. E. 97, 117 Ga. 567; Flenner
v. Southwest Mo. R. R., 290 S. W. 78, 221 Mo. App. 160.
mLottman v. Cuilla 228, S. W. 123 (Texas 1926).
'0Supra note 29.
TMN. C. CODE ANN. Sec. 618.
,"Same election is allowed in the limited MicH. ACT. See. 14497.
'N. Y. C. P. A. Sec. 211-a; N. C. CODE ANN. Sec. 618; (remainder of acts
employ term "contribution.")
'Note 32, 45 HARV. L. Rv. 374.
"TExAs REV. CODE ANN. Sec. 618.
"For a general comparison of the statutes, see 45 HAav. L. RFv. 371.
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is questionable whether the courts will permit contribution
among tortfeasors guilty of intentional harm. However, as
indicated before, the reasons for so limiting are not too sound.
There are some practical reasons for not confining contribu-
tion to common liability for negligence. For instance, a breach
of a criminal statute is frequently regarded as more reprehen-
sible than "common law negligence," and a person held liable
for such a breach is therefore denied recovery of contribution.
This view is hard to reconcile with the generally accepted view
that the inadvertent breach of such statutes as a basis of lia-
bility for damages is treated as "negligence per se." As one
of the foremost authorities in this field" has stated:
"In the interest of practical administrative conven-
ience, if for no other reason, the best proposal is to permit
contribution among all tortfeasors commonly liable for
the same damage, regardless of the nature of the particu-
lar derelictions involved."
Also as noted, the legislature in some of the states have
confined contribution among tortfeasors to those subjected to
joint and several judgment liability, thus virtually leaving to
the injured person the control of the distribution of loss
through contribution. He cannot be compelled to take judg-
ment against the tortfeasors whom he does not wish to sue.
By refusing to sue or take judgment against one or more of
several tortfeasors commonly liable to suffer judgment, even
though the trial would have proven them equally responsible
with the one against whom judgment was taken, the injured
person may confer immunity from contribution and at the
same time secure complete compensation from the luckless
tortfeasor whom he wishes to hold liable.
The tendency to alter the old common law doctrines in
this field in the light of modern conditions is well shown by
the recent ENGLISH JOINT TORTFEASORS ACT." As noted above,
the English common law view was that contribution should be
denied only in cases of wilful and intentional torts. However,
the English Act, in recognition of the lack of justification for
denying contribution in any type of tort action, allows contri-
bution between any persons liable for the same tort "whether
a crime or not."" By extending contribution to "any tortfeasor
liable," it apparently does away with the requirement of a
judgment as a condition precedent. Another intelligent pro-
-Gregory, Contribution Among Tortfeasor, 1938, Vis. L. REV. 36&
"LAw REFoRM ACT. 1935, 25 & 26 Geo. V, c. 30, Sees. 6, 7, and 8.
'Sec. 6(1).
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vision embodied in the act is that which provides that "the
amount of contribution recoverable from any person shall be
such as may be found by the court to be just and equitable,
having regard to the extent of that person's responsibility for
the damage, and the court shall have power to exempt any
person from liability to make contribution or to direct that
the contribution shall amount to a complete indemnity."'
The need for revision of the law regarding contribution
in the United States, as has been shown, is very evident. In
about one-fourth of the states, the statutory attempts at such
revision have not been too satisfactory, and in the remainder
of the states, with few exceptions, the strict common law view
is adhered to, although the courts in these latter jurisdictions
seem to be aware of the defects and injustice of such a rule.
The scattered legislation and decisions have failed to establish
any uniformity in result, but have succeeded in indicating
very strongly the need for the adoption of some common
policy.
In recent times, cases which require the application of the
rule of contribution among tortfeasors have increased rapidly
in volume, due primarily to the rapid increase in the number
of automobile accidents, causing the legal and social aspects
of this field of law to become extremely important. Therefore
the legislatures of the respective states, in light of the present
confused state of the law regarding contribution and its grow-
ing importance, should very seriously consider the benefits
which would accrue upon the adoption of a uniform act cov-
ering the subject.
Montana has no statute applicable where the question of
contribution among tortfeasors is raised, and as yet no cases
have been decided directly in point, so in all probability the
Montana Court would feel found to follow the majority com-
mon law view. But due to the injustice of this strict common
law view, and the failure of certain states to remedy the same
entirely by piece-meal legislation, it would be well for the
Montana Legislature to consider the provisions embodied in
the UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG JOINT TORTFEASORS ACT.'7
An adoption of legislation modeled upon this act would seem
advisable before Montana Courts are called upon definitely to
commit themselves in decisions in which a joint tortfeasor is
called upon to bear his fair share of the liability mposed.
The UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG JOINT TORTFEASORS
"See. 6(2).
"79 UN. L. ANN. 159.
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ACT was sponsored jointly by the American Law Institute and
the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. The
draft of this Act was approved in 1939.'
The principal provisions of this Act, which alter the ac-
cepted view, may be summarized as follows:
(1) The act permits contribution among all tortfeasors
whom the injured person could hold liable jointly and several-
ly for the same damage. Joint and several judgment liability
is not'a necessary prerequisite to the recovery of such contri-
bution."
(2) The creation of the right of contribution by the act
is not confined to any particular class of tortfeasors.'
(3) The pro rata shares of contribution should be deter-
mined on the basis of the "equity rule," to the effect that
such are to be determined according to the number of tortfeas-
ors commonly liable who are available within the jurisdiction
and who are financially solvent."
(4) An optional provision in the act stipulates that
where there is such a disproportion of fault among the tort-
feasors as to render inequitable an equal distribution among
them of the common liability by contribution, the relative de-
grees of fault of the joint tortfeasors shall be considered in de-
termining their pro rata shares."
(5) A release by the injured person of one tortfeasor
whether before or after judgment does not discharge the other
tortfeasors unless the release so provides; but' reduces the
claim against the others in the amount paid for the release."
An injured person acting in collusion with, or out of sympathy
for, one of the tortfeasors cannot relieve him from the obli-
gation to contribute to the other tortfeasors by releasing him.
The following states have adopted the act to date: Ark. 1941; Ha-
waii, 1941; Md. 1941; R. I. 1940.
"Sec. 1.
'Sec. 2(1).
"Sec. 2(1) (see ann.)
"Sec. 2(4). This section is inserted in the Act a an optional provision.
There is a very strong case to be made for th" adoption of this sub-
section, although two of the four states in which the Act has been
adopted, Md. & Ark., have omitted it. The apportionment device is
intended to work as follows: If the evidence indicates that there is a
disproportion of fault the court shall instruct the jury that if it finds
the tortfeasors to have been negligent, they shall also fix their rela-
tive degrees of fault. Thus if the court believes that an apportionment
of fault is inappropriate in a particul case, none will be made.
"Sec. 4 (ann.). See Black v. Martin, 1930, 292 P. 577, 88 Mont. 256;
Meinecke v. Intermountain Transp. Co., 1936, 55 P. (2d) 680, 101
Mont. 315; Towner v. Brown, 34 Mont. 121; Chisholm v. Vocational
School, 103 Mont. 503, 512, 64 P. (2) 838.
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The only way that such a release can free the tortfeasor from
his duty to contribute is to include a provision to the effect
that the other tortfeasors shall be released from the injured
person's pro rata share of the common liability.'
(7) Another optional section of the act enables one or
more of several tortfeasors sued by the injured person to add
as third-party defendants any fellow joint tortfeasors whom
they believe to have been also responsible for the tort. In this
way the interests of justice may be promoted by obviating the
necessity of a separate action for contribution.'
As can be easily seen, a legislative adoption of these pro-
visions of the Uniform Act would establish a system whereby
the respective liabilities of the tortfeasors could be equitably
and conveniently determined, and the distribution of loss
would be governed by the respective degrees of fault."
Robert Brooke.
IS A LANDLORD IN MONTANA ANSWERABLE IN TORT
FOR BREACH OF COVENANT TO REPAIR THE
LEASED PREMISES?
In this paper we shall deal with the question of a landlord
who contracts with his tenant to repair defects in the leased
premises and: fails to do so. Injury results to the tenant prox-
imately caused by such defect not being remedied by the land-
lord as he had agreed. Can the tenant recover in a tort action,
Sec. 5 (ann.)
'Sec. 7 (the procedural aspect of this section is modeled as closely as
possible after the new FEDERAL RULES OF CIviL PROCEDURE, 28 U. S.
C. A., following 723c.
"It might be well to note a recent criticism directed towards this mod-
ern view of the law of contribution among joint tortfeasors. Mr.
James, in 54 HARV. L. REv. 1170, advocates a program of socialization
of loss by the simple theory of retaining the common law rule against
contribution. His argument boils down to the premise that joint and
several liability among tortfeasors, without contribution, gives the in-jured person a free hand in shifting the loss to that tortfeasor best
able to bear it thus passing it on to society in general. This argu-
ment seems inconclusive due to the fact that it appears to be predicat-
ed on the rapid increase in joint tort liability in automobile accidents
where If no contribution is allowed, the loss in the majority of cases
would be borne by an insurance company, thus effecting a wider dis-
tribution of loss. In innumerable other tort actions, this result would
not follow.
For an excellent defense of the law allowing contribution among
Joint tortfeasors, in answer to the theory broached by Mr. James, see
Mr. Gregory's reply in 54 HARV. L. REv. 1170.
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